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Home Rule in New York: The Need
For a Change
By Michael A. Cardozo & Zachary W. Klinger*
I. Introduction
Throughout the twelve years that one of the authors served
as the Corporation Counsel for the city of New York under Mayor
Michael R. Bloomberg, the Law Department litigated thousands
of cases involving issues ranging from taxation to transportation
to the proper scope of governmental activity. As often arises
from city politics, some of these matters resulted from disputes
between Mayor Bloomberg and the State while many others
involved disagreements with the New York City Council.1 In
fact, during Mayor Bloomberg’s first term alone, a recalcitrant
City Council overrode his vetoes a record thirty-five times.2
Regardless of the subject of contention, one issue manifested
itself repeatedly—involving the power of municipalities to selfgovern without state intervention—Home Rule.3 The clashes
with the City Council often implicated the State (and thus Home
Rule) regardless of whether the litigation involved gay rights,
procurement standards, collective bargaining, or even taxis.
The author’s twelve years of experience as corporation counsel
afforded him an inside look into the practicalities and nuances
of the Home Rule debate and provided him with a greater
understanding of Home Rule’s benefits as well as its flaws.
This article is intended to provide a practical lens into how
these Home Rule issues unfold in complex matters involving the
* Michael A. Cardozo (JD Columbia Law School 1966, BA Brown University
1963) is a partner at Proskauer Rose LLP. He served as the New York City
Corporation Counsel under Mayor Michael Bloomberg from 2002-2013.
Zachary W. Klinger (JD New York University School of Law 2015, AB
Princeton University 2010) is an associate at Proskauer Rose LLP.
1. See Winnie Hu, Mayor Need Not Enforce Certain Laws, Court Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/15/nyregion/may
or-need-not-enforce-certain-laws-court-rules.html.
2. Id.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (commonly referred to as the “Home Rule”
provision).
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City, and to suggest how a much-needed Home Rule
constitutional amendment could re-shape or, at the very least,
clarify Home Rule standards. Section II will provide some
historical and legal background on Home Rule; Section III will
analyze some of the more well-known Home Rule cases that the
Law
Department
litigated
during
the
Bloomberg
Administration; and Section IV will discuss insights gleaned
with respect to, and will offer several recommendations for, the
future of Home Rule in New York.
II. Legal Background
Adopted in 19634 with the intended purpose, in the words of
former Governor Rockefeller, of “strengthen[ing] the
governments closest to the people so that they may help meet
the present and emerging needs of [the] time,”5 article IX,
section 2 of the New York State Constitution (commonly referred
to as the “Home Rule” provision) allocates power between the
state and local governments.6 Under section 2(c), the “center of
home rule powers,”7 every local government is empowered:
(1) To adopt or amend local laws relating to its
“property, affairs or government” which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or any general law; and
(2) To adopt or amend local laws, not inconsistent
with the Constitution or any general law,

4. While the New York State Constitution has always carved out limited
spheres of local autonomy, a full Home Rule constitutional amendment was
not adopted until 1923. See Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1966). At that time, local legislative powers
were delegated to municipalities in only nine specific areas. Id. at 1147. A
1928 statute permitted local governments to act, consistent with general law,
in matters relating to their “property, affairs or government,” but local
authority remained weak. Id. at 1147-48. The basic form and substance of the
1923 amendment would remain in effect until the adoption of new Home Rule
provisions in 1963. Id.
5. ROBERT B. WARD, NEW YORK STATE GOVERNMENT 547 (2d ed. 2006).
6. See id. at 547-49.
7. PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW
YORK 290 (1996).
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relating to ten enumerated subjects,8 whether
or not they relate to its “property, affairs, or
government” subject, however, to the power of
the Legislature, under Section 2(b)(3), to
restrict the adoption of such a local law not
relating to property, affairs or government.9
Under section 2(b)(2), this means that the state legislature is
specifically prohibited from acting with respect to the “property,
affairs or government of any local government,” except by
general law or by special law enacted at the request of two-thirds
of the membership of a local legislative body, or at the “request
of its chief executive officer concurred in by a majority” of the
legislative body, or except in the case of New York City, by a twothirds vote of each house upon receiving a “certificate of
necessity from the governor.”10
While the “rights, powers, privileges and immunities”
afforded to local governments by article IX are to be “liberally
construed,”11 section 3(a) explicitly states that the
aforementioned limitations on the State’s power do not “restrict
or impair any power of the legislature” with regard to: (1) the
public school system or any retirement system pertaining to
8. The “ten enumerated subjects” being:
(1) The powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of
selection and removal, terms of office, compensation, hours of
work, protection, welfare and safety of [local] officers and
employees. (2) In the case of a city, town or village, the
membership and composition of the local legislative body. (3)
The transaction of its business; (4) The incurring of its
obligations. (5) The presentation, ascertainment and
discharge of claims against it. (6) The acquisition, care,
management and use of its highways, roads, streets, avenues
and property. (7) The acquisition of its transit facilities and
the ownership and operation thereof. (8) The levy, collection
and administration of [its] taxes . . . . (9) The wages or
salaries, the hours of work or labor, and the protection,
welfare and safety of persons employed by any contractor or
sub-contractor performing work, labor or services for it. (10)
The government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health
and well-being of its people and property.
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2(c)(ii)(1)-(10).
9. Id. art. IX, § 2(c).
10. Id. art. IX § 2(b)(2).
11. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 51 (McKinney 1994).
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such, (2) the courts, and (3) matters outside the scope of the
property, affairs or government of a local government.12
Briefly, general laws apply to all localities in the state while
special laws apply to “one or more, but not all,” localities.13
There are no constitutional limits on the power of the legislature
to pass general laws. However, for the legislature to pass a
special law that would affect only a particular locality’s property,
affairs or government, it must receive a Home Rule message (i.e.,
a formal request from the locality for the State to intervene).14
There are two important limitations on the restrictions
imposed on the legislature in enacting what would appear to be
special laws. First, in the case of New York City, under the
classification doctrine, a law is considered general even if it
applies only to a limited number of localities (e.g., “cities having
a population of 1,000,000 or more,”)15 so long as the law is based
upon characteristics reasonably related to the subject of the law,
and it does not serve merely to designate and identify the places
to be affected.16
The second limitation on the restriction of the State’s
authority to enact what would appear to be a special law lies in
a doctrine, first articulated in Chief Judge Cardozo’s concurring
opinion in Adler v. Deegan.17 Under Adler, when the State
possesses a substantial interest in the subject matter, and the
enactment bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate
accompanying substantial state concern, the State may legislate
on what would otherwise be a local matter.18 In Adler, the court
of appeals found constitutional a state-enacted multiple
dwelling law—applicable only to cities of more than eight-

12. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3(a).
13. Id. art. IX, §§ 3(d)(1), (4).
14. Id. art. IX, § 2(b)(2)(a).
15. See generally, Farrington v. Pinckney, 133 N.E.2d 817, 831 (N.Y. 1956)
(holding classification based on population to be a general law that did not
violate N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17). While beyond the focus of this article, the
classification doctrine, though long accepted, in practice allows for the
curtailment of Home Rule authority; its impact may also merit re-thinking.
16. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17.
17. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 709-14 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
18. Id. at 713-14.
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hundred thousand inhabitants19 and promulgated to combat
hazardous and unsanitary living conditions in city tenements—
notwithstanding that it had been enacted without a Home Rule
message.
Such a request would ordinarily be required for state
legislation applicable only to a particular locality. In upholding
the law, and articulating what would become known as the
substantial state concern doctrine, Chief Judge Cardozo wrote:
“[w]here the area sought to be legislated implicates concerns
that overlap and intermingle between the State and the locality,
but involves a substantial State concern, the State may freely
legislate notwithstanding the fact that the concern of the State
may also touch upon local matters.”20 While the Adler opinion
was issued more than thirty years before the adoption of the
present Home Rule constitutional provisions, it remains, as
discussed below, a guiding principle of Home Rule today.
Courts focus on the stated purpose and legislative history of
the act in question to assess whether a substantial state interest
exists. For an act to bear a reasonable relationship to the
substantial state interest, it must advance the asserted state
interest.21
In addition to the substantial state concern doctrine,
preemption principles also bear heavily on the analytic
framework of Home Rule. Preemption can be either express or
implied.22 Express preemption occurs when a state statute is
explicitly intended to preempt local law,23 while implied
preemption exists when a local law either conflicts with a state
statute (i.e., conflict preemption) or intrudes on an area for
which the State has “assumed full regulatory responsibility” or

19. See id. at 709. While Justice Pound, in concurrence, recognized that
the Multiple Dwelling Law could be upheld under the classification doctrine
discussed above, the law was ultimately found constitutional on other grounds
(i.e., the State’s police power). Id. at 709-10 (Pound, J., concurring).
20. City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y., Inc., 642
N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1010 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (citing Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713
(N.Y. 1929)).
21. See Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State (Green Cabs), 993 N.E.2d 393,
400 (N.Y. 2013).
22. See DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 190 (N.Y.
2001).
23. Id.
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has demonstrated a need for statewide uniformity (i.e., field
preemption).24 As the court of appeals has explained:
Where it is determined that the State has
preempted an entire field, a local law regulating
the same subject matter is deemed inconsistent
with the State’s overriding interests because it
either (1) prohibits conduct which the State law,
although perhaps not expressly speaking to,
considers acceptable or at least does not proscribe
or (2) imposes additional restrictions on rights
granted by State law.25
The substantial state concern and preemption doctrines have
had a dramatic impact on the power dynamic between the
legislature and local authorities. In practice, both doctrines have
effectively curbed the autonomy of local governments—even
though, as the court of appeals has written, “the 1963 home rule
amendment was intended to expand and secure the powers
enjoyed by local governments.”26 The next section will address
the formidable role the preemption and substantial state
concern doctrines played in the Home Rule cases litigated during
the Bloomberg years.
III. Home Rule and the Bloomberg Administration
A. Express Preemption
The earliest Home Rule problems faced by the Bloomberg
Administration were unsolvable at the local level because of
express preemption. First, in the wake of the devastating
attacks of September 11, 2001, the City found itself in the midst
of a deep financial crisis.27 Facing a potential six billion dollar
deficit, the City needed substantial additional revenue but
24. Id.
25. Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1987)
(internal citations omitted).
26. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 585 (N.Y. 1977).
27. Glenn Pasanen, Analysis: The Bloomberg Fiscal Legacy, GOTHAM
GAZETTE (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/opinion/
4739-the-bloomberg-fiscal-legacy.
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lacked the power to raise taxes on city residents.28 This was
because the City’s taxing authority,29 with few exceptions such
as property taxes, is subject to approval by the legislature and
the governor.30 Therefore, notwithstanding the mayor and City
Council’s agreement on the need for increased taxes to meet the
City’s post-September 11th financial challenges, the City was
expressly preempted from doing so because the power to tax is
explicitly reserved to the State.31 Eventually, with Albany’s
approval, the City was able to implement a package of property,
28. Id.
29. See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
30. See id. art. XVI, § 1. See also Expedia, Inc. v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of
Fin., 3 N.E.3d 121, 124-25 (N.Y. 2013) (“In New York, local governments lack
an independent power to tax. The State Constitution vests the taxing power in
the state legislature and authorizes the legislature to delegate that power to
local governments.” (internal citations omitted)). Conversely, the State can
eliminate a City tax without the City’s consent, as it did with the City’s
controversial “commuter tax.” See City of New York v. State (Commuter Tax),
730 N.E.2d 920, 926-27 (N.Y. 2000). In Commuter Tax, the New York Court of
Appeals unanimously upheld the State’s elimination of the City’s previously
imposed tax on commuters on state law grounds. Id. Notwithstanding the fact
that the repeal was “concededly a special law applying only to New York City,”
the court held that the State did not require a Home Rule message in order to
implement the law eliminating the tax (even though the legislature had
requested one when the enabling law was initially enacted). Id. at 925. The
court’s reasoning was twofold: it explained that “[t]he power to tax, of course,
rests solely with the Legislature,” and further that the State maintained a
substantial interest in regulating a tax policy affecting hundreds of thousands
of state residents who worked, but did not live, in the city. Id. at 925-26.
Without opining on the political motivations behind the repeal, these findings
were sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that a Home Rule message
was not required to repeal the previously imposed tax. Id. at 926.
31. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. A post-Bloomberg decision highlights
the constraints placed on local governments in the wake of the State’s taxing
authority. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.
City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene (Sugary Drinks), 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y.
2014). In Sugary Drinks, the City Board of Health, at Mayor Bloomberg’s
urging, promulgated an amendment to the City Health Code prohibiting food
service establishments in the city from serving certain drinks in sizes larger
than 16 ounces (the “Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule” or “Rule”). Id. at 541.
This regulation was the preferred alternative to a “soda tax,” since a tax, rather
than a size limit, would require state approval. However, even this approach
was ultimately found impermissible after a coalition of interest groups
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap
Rule. Id. at 549. The New York Court of Appeals ruled the regulation invalid,
holding that, in imposing the Rule, the City Board of Health had exceeded the
scope of its regulatory authority and infringed on the legislative powers of the
City Council. Id.
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personal income and sales tax increases that amounted to
roughly three billion dollars in additional revenues for the
City.32
In a similar example of express preemption, Mayor
Bloomberg had vigorously campaigned on the promise of
reforming the City’s deteriorating public education system.33
Again, the City Council was largely in agreement with the
mayor’s plan to increase local control of the city schools.34
However, similar to its taxing power, the City’s authority in the
education arena is expressly limited by the New York State
Constitution (specifically article XI, section 1), which places the
maintenance and support of the State’s public schools solely
within the province of the State.35 Therefore, the mayor once
again found the City expressly preempted from taking control of
its public schools. Fortunately, the mayor was able to persuade
the legislature to grant his administration broader control over
the City’s public school system than the previous
administration.36 This authority, known as mayoral control,
allowed the mayor to make decisions, without seeking state
legislative approval, directly affecting the City’s public school
system, such as appointing members to the New York City
Board of Education, hiring or firing the city schools chancellors,
and closing failing schools.37 As events during the de Blasio
Administration highlight, this debate over mayoral control
continues.38
32. Pasanen, supra note 27.
33. See Seven Years of Mayoral Control, GOTHAM GAZETTE [hereinafter
Seven Years], http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/archives/377-sevenyears-of-mayoral-control (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
34. Id.
35. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
36. Seven Years, supra note 33.
37. Id.
38. Id. Although Mayor de Blasio had initially requested a seven-year
extension of mayoral control, the legislature has only agreed, after contentious
debate on three separate occasions, to two one-year extensions and one twoyear extension.
See Kate Taylor, De Blasio Keeps Control of City’s
(June
18,
Schools,
but
Only
for
a
Year,
N.Y.
TIMES
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/nyregion/de-blasio-keeps-controlof-citys-schools-but-only-for-a-year.html; Jesse McKinley & Lisa W. Foderaro,
Assembly Approves 2-Year Deal on Mayoral Control of New York City
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/28/nyr
egion/potential-deal-in-albany-on-mayoral-control-of-schools.html?_r=0. See
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Another example of express preemption can be found in
Mayor Bloomberg’s effort to reduce traffic in the city, while
simultaneously addressing the City’s future environmental
sustainability. The mayor sought to introduce a congestion
pricing system that would impose a fee on drivers entering and
leaving Manhattan’s central business district during peak
hours.39 However, because the City had pursued federal funding
for the program, it needed the legislature to grant it pricing
authority and agree to implement the program within a two-year
period—both pre-requisites to receiving the federal funds.40
Despite support from the legislature’s Traffic Congestion
Mitigation Commission, the City Council, then-Governor
Paterson and a broad coalition of advocacy groups, the
legislature failed to vote on the plan before the deadline for
federal funding expired.41
There is a plausible argument that if federal funds had not
been involved, the City had the authority to impose fees on city
drivers, like congestion pricing, even without the legislature’s
approval.42 Section 1642(a)(4) of the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law (“VTL”) provides that cities with over one million
residents (i.e., the City) may impose “tolls, taxes, [and] fees . . .
for the use of the highway or any of its parts, where the

also Elizabeth A. Harris, Chancellor Praises de Blasio’s Education Gains as
Debate to Control Schools Nears, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/nyregion/carmen-farina-bill-de-blasiopublic-school-control.html?_r=0.
39. See Gail Robinson, Breaking the Gridlock on Congestion Pricing,
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/t
ransportation/3922-breaking-the-gridlock-on-congestion-pricing.
40. Id.
41. New York City Congestion Pricing Program Case Study, NATIONAL
COOPERATIVE HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM 5 (Sept. 2009), http://www.transp
ortation-finance.org/pdf/featured_documents/nchrp_20_24_62_nyc.pdf.
42. This position is currently being advanced by groups, such as Move NY,
which has recently proposed a $2.75 congestion pricing fee on cars entering
Manhattan’s central business zone during peak hours. See Paul Berger,
Proposal for Congestion Charge on New York City Motorists, WALL ST. J. (June
4, 2017, 7:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/article_email/proposal-for-congestioncharge-on-new-york-city-motorists-1496581200-lMyQjAxMTE3MDA2NTYwO
TUzWj.; Roderick M. Hills, NYC Doesn’t Need Albany’s Permission to
Enact Congestion Pricing, STREETSBLOG NYC (July 16, 2012),
http://nyc.streetsblog.org/2012/07/16/nyc-doesnt-need-albanys- permission- toenact-congestion-pricing.
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imposition thereof is authorized by law.”43 This provision has
been understood by some to mean that the City may impose fees
on drivers’ use of city streets only when these fees are authorized
by a separate state law. However, construing VTL section
1642(a)(4) to authorize fees only when some other state statute
also authorizes such fees would render the italicized section
redundant and meaningless. A more reasonable reading of the
provision would hold that the City is authorized to impose fees
on city drivers as long as these fees are authorized by either state
or local law.44
B. Implied Preemption
In addition to the express preemption examples, where the
Home Rule answers were so clear it would have been futile to
litigate them, there are a number of implied preemption cases
that were litigated during the Bloomberg Era, such as those
discussed below, which highlight the lack of clarity in the Home
Rule law as it exists today.
The “Peace Officers” Case
The first case involving Home Rule litigated by the Law
Department after Mayor Bloomberg’s election was a holdover
from the Giuliani Administration. In New York City Health and
Hospitals Corp. v. Council of New York, the New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”) had sued the City
Council seeking to invalidate Local Law 16 of 2001 that
mandated that city-funded hospitals utilize peace officers as

43. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1642(a)(4) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis
added).
44. As another example of state control, the VTL also governs city traffic
control initiatives and violation-monitoring systems. Almost thirty years ago,
the legislature enacted VTL § 1111-a which permitted the installation of red
light cameras in cities with a population of one million or more (i.e. the City).
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1111-a (McKinney 2011). The City then used this
authorization to launch the nation’s first Red Light Camera program. See N.Y.
CITY DEP’T OF TRANSP., NEW YORK CITY RED LIGHT CAMERA PROGRAM: PROGRAM
REVIEW 1994-2015 at 2 (2016). Since 1994, the legislature has extended the
duration of the City’s program seven times. Id.
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security guards.45 In an effort to preserve resources, HHC had
begun to replace peace officers with private security guards (who
lacked peace officer status and who were paid a lower salary).46
Employing its broad police power with regard to the public
welfare,47 and maintaining that the law would promote the
safety of patients, staff, and visitors of the City’s hospitals, the
City Council enacted Local Law 16 over then-Mayor Giuliani’s
veto.48 HHC then challenged the city legislation, arguing that it
conflicted with, and was preempted by, the HHC Act—the state
law that governs HHC.49 The City and the affected union, Local
237, subsequently intervened as plaintiff and defendant,
respectively.50
The First Department held the law preempted, finding that
through the HHC Act, “the Legislature [had] both impliedly and
expressly evinced an intent to preempt” the area of the City’s
hospital system.51 More specifically, the court determined that
the local law was inconsistent with the HHC Act’s provisions
affording HHC complete autonomy over personnel qualifications
and outsourcing, and that the State had demonstrated an intent
to preempt the entire health care field thereby precluding any
further local regulation.52 The court also noted that the law did
not fall within the narrow preemption exception, which allows
for “‘generally applicable’ local laws that only ‘incidentally
infringe’ upon the powers of state created entities.”53 Here, the
court explained, the local law was not one of general
applicability since it applied only to HHC’s facilities and not to
all of the City’s hospitals. Further, the enactment had more
than a tangential or incidental impact because it affected only
security guards who were not health care personnel and

45. See N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Council of N.Y. (Peace Officers),
752 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667-68 (App. Div. 2003).
46. Id. at 667.
47. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2011); N.Y.C. Charter
ch. 2, § 28.
48. Peace Officers, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
49. Id. at 668.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 671.
52. Id. at 671-72.
53. Peace Officers, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
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intruded on HHC’s autonomy concerning personnel decisions.54
While the court’s decision was essentially later nullified by a
2003 state law requiring peace officers to perform security
functions at HHC facilities,55 the court’s analysis demonstrated
its deference to state preemption—a proclivity that would recur
in the administration’s subsequent legal clashes with the City
Council.
The “Predatory Lending” Case
Mayor Bloomberg again prevailed over the City Council the
following year in Mayor of New York v. Council of New York
(“Predatory Lending”).56 In Predatory Lending, the mayor
challenged the validity of a local law, passed over his veto,
prohibiting city agencies from doing business with, depositing
funds with, or providing financial assistance to, financial
institutions that engaged in “predatory” lending practices.57 The
Predatory Lending Court declared the law void on both conflict
and field preemption grounds.58 The court found provisions of
the local ordinance to be “in substantial conflict” with the state
banking law, with the potential to “disrupt the operation” of the
state statute.59 In addition, the court explained, the state
banking law “contains a comprehensive regulatory scheme” that
provides “uniform regulation of the residential mortgage lending
process.”60 In the court’s view, this was sufficient to manifest
the legislature’s intent to occupy the entire field of financial
lending.61 Therefore, the City Council’s contention that the law
was permissive because the legislature failed to include express
preemption language in the law proved unavailing; the
exhaustive provisions of the state statute evinced the State’s
desire to preclude local legislation in the predatory lending
54. Id. at 673-74.
55. Act of October 15, 2003, ch. 671, 2003 N.Y. Laws 671 (codified as
amended at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10 (McKinney 2003)).
56. Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y. (Predatory Lending), 780 N.Y.S.2d
266 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
57. See id. at 269.
58. See id. at 273-74.
59. Id. at 275.
60. Id. at 273-74.
61. See Predatory Lending, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
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arena.62
The “Domestic Partners” Case
In Council of New York v. Bloomberg (“Domestic Partners”),
another preemption case, the court of appeals, by a four to three
vote, again ruled in the mayor’s favor.63 The dispute arose from
the City Council’s 2004 passage over the mayor’s veto of an equal
benefits law (“EBL”) that prohibited city agencies from
contracting with businesses that failed to provide its employees’
domestic partners with employment benefits equal to those of
employees’ spouses.64 The mayor initially filed a declaratory
judgment action, asserting that the EBL was preempted by both
state law requiring government agencies to engage in
competitive bidding practices and federal law prescribing the
terms of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
benefit plans.65 When the mayor’s application for a temporary
restraining order was denied, he declared that he would not
enforce the EBL until its validity had been decided, citing his
right and duty not to execute unlawful ordinances.66 In
response, the City Council commenced an Article 78 proceeding
to compel the mayor to enforce the EBL. The supreme court
granted the City Council’s petition, relying on what the court
deemed “the presumption of validity.”67 The appellate division,
however, unanimously reversed and the court of appeals
affirmed.68
In sustaining the mayor’s actions, the state’s highest court
first explained that the validity of the EBL could be raised as a
defense by the mayor in an Article 78 proceeding and that he
had acted properly in refusing to enforce a law he believed
invalid.69 On the question of Home Rule, the Domestic Partners

62. See id. at 274-75.
63. Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg (Domestic Partners), 846 N.E.2d 433
(N.Y. 2006).
64. Id. at 435.
65. Id. at 435-46.
66. Id. at 436.
67. Id.
68. See Domestic Partners, 846 N.E.2d at 435-37.
69. See id. at 436.

13

CARDOZO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

HOME RULE IN NEW YORK

10/23/17 10:08 PM

103

Court held that despite the City Council’s social policy
intentions, the EBL would violate the purpose of the state’s
competitive bidding statute.70 By way of example, the court
pointed out that contract specifications could be drafted in such
a manner as to favor contractors who provided particular
benefits to its employees (e.g., for domestic partners).71 The
court found this potential outcome undermined the purpose of
the state’s competitive bidding statute, which was to save
municipalities money as well as “to prevent ‘favoritism,
improvidence, fraud and corruption in the awarding of public
contracts.’”72 While acknowledging that local governments
maintain the power to legislate in the area of employee welfare
and safety,73 the court noted that this power is curtailed by
contrary state legislation—the state’s competitive bidding
statute is one such law.74 Thus, once again, a local law was
struck down on preemption grounds.
The “Uniformed Service Members” Case
In 2007, the mayor’s win streak in suits against the City
Council came to an end. The case involved the validity of
legislation passed over former Mayor Giuliani’s veto that gave
the New York City Fire Department’s alarm dispatchers and
emergency medical technicians the status of uniformed fire
service members for collective bargaining purposes.75 The
former mayor had sued to have the law declared invalid,76
arguing that the local law was preempted by the state’s Taylor
Law governing public sector labor relations.77 In affirming the

70. See id. at 439.
71. See id. at 438.
72. Id. at 438 (quoting In re N.Y. State Chapter, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 185, 190
(N.Y. 1996)).
73. Domestic Partners, 846 N.E.2d at 439-40. Specifically, for those
individuals performing work, labor, or services for the municipality. See N.Y.
CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii)(9); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE § 10(1)(ii)(a)(10).
74. Domestic Partners, 846 N.E.2d at 440 (“[w]here the two conflict, as
they do here, the legislative restriction on the municipality’s power prevails.”).
75. Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y. (Uniformed Service Members), 874
N.E.2d 706, 707 (N.Y. 2007).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 710.
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lower courts, the court of appeals held that the local law was not
preempted, finding that localities were permitted to exercise
discretion regarding the procedures by which bargaining units
are determined, meaning the local law was consistent with—and
not preempted by—the Taylor Law.78
Although the administration was largely successful in
litigating these implied preemption cases,79 each highlight
considerable uncertainty surrounding whether a particular local
law is, or is not, preempted. The cases reviewed above illustrate
that relying on the courts rather than the legislature to
determine the legislature’s preemptive intent can be
problematic. In the absence of an explicit declaration by the
legislature, asking the courts to resolve the preemption issue has
frequently resulted in a presumption in favor of preemption in
the Home Rule context.80 In the concluding section of this
article, we discuss the benefits of imposing a greater burden on
the legislature to demonstrate its intent to preempt local
legislation. Imposing such a burden would, we believe, simplify
78. See id. at 709-10. The court also determined that the City Council did
not require a referendum to enact the local law since it did not improperly
encroach on the mayor’s role in city government. Id. at 711. Generally, a
referendum is required for legislation that “curtails any power of an elective
officer.” N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE § 23(2)(f) (McKinney 1994).
79. While decided after Mayor Bloomberg left office, Patrolmen’s
Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York
(Discriminatory Policing), 35 N.Y.S.3d 314 (App. Div. 2016) also involved
implied preemption issues in the context of Home Rule. In Discriminatory
Policing, the City Council enacted a local law over Mayor Bloomberg’s veto
which provided a civil cause of action to individuals who claimed to have been
subject to discriminatory law enforcement practices by the City. Id. at 316-17.
Unions representing the City’s police officers and sergeants challenged the law
as preempted by the state’s Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”). Id. at 317. The
court of appeals upheld the law, finding it to be one of anti-discrimination and
not criminal procedure (and thus not preempted by the CPL), and also
determined that there was no conflict with state law. Id. at 319-20.
80. This has caused some scholars to argue for a judicial presumption
against preemption. For instance, Professor Roderick Hills has posited that
because the Home Rule powers are to be “liberally construed,” this requires “a
qualified presumption against preemption: Unless statutory text manifestly
and unambiguously supersedes local law, courts should presume that state law
does not preempt local laws. [But the presumption] can be overcome where
local laws encroach on some substantial state interest that local residents are
likely to ignore.” Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Hydrofracking and Home Rule:
Defending and Defining an Anti-Preemption Canon of Statutory Construction
in New York, 77 ALB. L. REV. 647, 648 (2014).
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the preemption analysis, give somewhat more authority to local
governments, and provide more clarity to both localities and the
State.
C. Substantial State Concern
In addition to preemption, the substantial state concern
doctrine played a major role in the Home Rule issues litigated
during the Bloomberg Administration. Before discussing those
cases, it is important to first discuss a court of appeals decision
pre-dating the Bloomberg Era, which foreshadowed issues the
administration would face in the Home Rule context and helped
shape the strategy the Law Department would employ to
advance the Bloomberg Agenda.
“PBA I” and “PBA II”
In City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of
the City of New York, Inc. (“PBA I”)81 the City brought a
declaratory judgment action challenging a state law82 which
provided the Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”)
exclusive jurisdiction over negotiation impasses between the city
police and firefighter unions and the City.83 The dispute arose
out of legislation, passed at the behest of the Patrolmen’s
Benevolent Association (“PBA,”)84 which shifted jurisdiction
over resolving such impasses from the locally-created city Board
of Collective Bargaining (“BCB”) to the state-created PERB.85 In
81. See City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of the City of
N.Y. Inc. (PBA I), 676 N.E.2d 847, 849 (N.Y. 1996).
82. Act of February 12, 1996, ch. 13, 1996 N.Y. Laws 50.
83. PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 848.
84. The PBA believed PERB to be a more favorable forum at the time. See
id. at 849. After voting in favor of the law, the legislature was forced to override
then-Governor Pataki’s veto in order for the law to take effect. Id.
85. See id. at 849. PERB was created under the Taylor Law to facilitate
the resolution of labor disputes between public employers and employees. Id.
at 848. The Taylor Law also allows municipalities to create local bodies, often
referred to as mini-PERBs, to resolve disagreements. Id. Although at one time
there were as many as thirty-five mini-PERBs, as of 2011, the BCB was one of
only four remaining in the state. See Jurisdiction to Resolve an Impasse in
Collective Bargaining Under the Taylor Law, N.Y. PUB. PERSONNEL LAW (Aug.
11, 2011), https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2011/08/jurisdiction-to-
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upholding both the trial court and the appellate division, the
court of appeals found the state statute unconstitutional because
“this ‘special law,’ which relate[d] to the ‘property, affairs, or
government’ of New York City, was not enacted to further a
matter of ‘sufficient importance to the State generally’ [such
that] its enactment without a home rule message from New York
City render[ed] the chapter law unconstitutional and
unenforceable.”86
In a dramatic lesson as to how the State could
constitutionally pass close to identical legislation, the
legislature, two years later, passed another law setting out
practically the same terms but curing the constitutional defects
of the previously overturned law.87 In contrast to the earlier
legislation, the revised law, Chapter 641 of the Laws of 1998,
extended PERB’s jurisdiction to all police and firefighter unions
in the state.88 After negotiations stalled in the collective
bargaining between the City and PBA in 2000 (the first
collective bargaining since the enactment of the new law), the
City sued to have that law declared unconstitutional.89 The law
was a special law, the City argued, in violation of the Home Rule
provisions because it “singl[ed] out the City of New York and its
three neighboring counties by establishing a new system for
them totally at odds with the rest of the State.”90 The appellate
division, affirming the supreme court, upheld the new law
finding it to be a general law of statewide application, which
therefore did not require a Home Rule message as a precondition
for its enactment.91 The court of appeals also affirmed, although
on different grounds, holding that:
[B]ecause chapter 641 is a “special law” that
serves a substantial State concern, the home rule
requirements were not implicated and thus the
statute is constitutional and enforceable even
resolve-impasse-in.html.
86. See PBA I, 676 N.E.2d at 848 (internal citations omitted).
87. See Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. v. City of New York (PBA
II), 767 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 2001).
88. Act of December 18, 1998, ch. 13, 1996 N.Y. Laws 641.
89. See PBA II, 767 N.E.2d at 119.
90. Id. at 119.
91. See id. at 119.
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absent a home rule message. We further hold that
once a police or fire union opts to seek impasse
resolution by PERB and PERB declares an
impasse, chapter 641 gives PERB exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve such an impasse.92
Notably, while the court “agree[ed] with the courts below that by
its terms, chapter 641 applie[d] to all local governments,” it
explained that since the City and three surrounding suburbs
were the only affected localities, “the actual effect of chapter 641
[was] a restriction targeted at [the] four localities,” which
continued to exercise the preexisting local option that, but for
the challenged law, permitted the creation of mini-PERBs to
address collective bargaining impasses.93 As such, Chapter 641
was declared a special law and not a general law.94 Nonetheless,
a Home Rule message was not required because the legislature
“expressly stat[ed] the substantial State concern sought to be
addressed [by Chapter 641] and ensur[ed] that the legislation
[was] rationally related to that concern.”95
Despite the court of appeals’ substantial effort to
demonstrate consistency in its decision-making, PBA I and PBA
II illustrate the ease with which an apparent Home Rule
violation can be reframed as one of substantial state concern. By
inserting a purported state interest into a piece of state
legislation previously found illegal because it only dealt with a
single local entity, and ensuring that the law was “rationally
related” to that stated purpose, the legislature had—and
continues to enjoy—tremendous flexibility in avoiding the Home
Rule requirements. Including such language in a proposed law
is a fairly simple drafting task and constitutional scholars would
likely agree that setting out a “rational relationship” is relatively
easy to accomplish. In these cases, two virtually identical laws
92. Id. at 117-18 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 121.
94. See PBA II, 767 N.E.2d at 124.
95. Id. at 122. The court explained that Chapter 641 is intended “to foster
[the] ‘orderly resolution of collective bargaining disputes involving police and
fire bargaining units . . . to enhance public safety and prevent the loss or
interruption of vital public services,’” and determined that “fulfillment of this
legislative purpose is rationally served by chapter 641, which mandates that
all local governments allow their police and fire unions access to PERB impasse
procedures in resolving public sector labor disputes.” Id. at 122.
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resulted in two very different constitutional determinations
even though both sought identical outcomes.
An optimistic assessment would maintain that this type of
legal analysis forces the legislature to be clear about the
intended state purpose of the proposed legislation and to tailor
it in such a way as to actually further that identified state
interest. A more pessimistic analysis would be that merely
introducing state concern language into a law’s preamble—even
if merely pretextual—results in a court deferring to the
legislature and finding a substantial state concern even when
one was not intended. This problem is compounded by the fact
that “[i]n determining a substantial State concern, [the court]
‘rel[ies] upon the stated purpose and legislative history of the act
in question’ . . . as the Supreme Court aptly noted, the ‘wisdom
of that determination is not for court review here.’”96 Regardless
of these diverging points of view, the teachings of PBA I and PBA
II would become particularly clear in the most publicized Home
Rule case litigated during the Bloomberg Administration—the
“Green Cabs” case.97
The “Green Cabs” Case
Seeing a need to increase the availability of taxis (i.e., yellow
taxis and livery service vehicles) in certain underserved areas of
the city (particularly northern Manhattan and the outer
boroughs), and stymied by the City Council’s refusal to issue a
Home Rule message that would allow passage of local legislation
dealing with the issue, Mayor Bloomberg turned to the state
legislature to pass the HAIL Act.98 The HAIL Act allowed for
the sale of eighteen thousand new medallions for livery vehicles
to pick up curbside passengers in those underserved areas, and
another two thousand medallions for wheelchair-accessible
yellow taxis.99 The Act was projected to generate over one billion
96. See PBA II, 767 N.E.2d at 122.
97. Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State (Green Cabs), 993 N.E.2d 393, 400
(N.Y. 2013).
98. Hail Accessible Inter-borough License Act, ch. 602, § 1, 2011 N.Y. Sess.
Laws (McKinney) [hereinafter HAIL Act].
99. See Green Cabs, 993 N.E.2d at 398. The medallions were to be
distributed in increments of six thousand over a three-year period. One-fifth
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in revenue for the City.100 A group of medallion owners, in
alignment with members of the City Council and then public
advocate and future Mayor Bill de Blasio, challenged the Act as
violative of the Home Rule and other provisions of the state
constitution.101
After the lower court had ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, the
state’s highest court, on direct appeal, reversed.102 The court
upheld the constitutionality of the law because it was designed
to further a substantial state concern—namely, improved access
to street-hail transportation throughout the five boroughs103
(and, in particular, for disabled individuals and those who reside
or work in areas outside of Manhattan’s central business
district). Judge Pigott, on behalf of a unanimous court, wrote:
We conclude that the HAIL Act addresses a
matter of substantial state concern. This is not a
purely local issue. Millions of people from within
and without the State visit the City annually.
Some of these visitors are disabled, and will
undoubtably [sic] benefit from the increase in
accessible vehicles in the Manhattan central
business district and in the outer boroughs. The
Act is for the benefit of all New Yorkers, and not
merely those residing within the City. Efficient
transportation service in the State’s largest city
and international center of commerce is important
to the entire State. The Act plainly furthers all of
these significant goals.104
Similar to PBA I and PBA II, the Green Cabs Court pointed
to the HAIL Act’s preamble to support its interpretation of the
of the first six thousand vehicles would need to be handicap-accessible. Id. at
398. The remaining twelve thousand would also be subject to the twenty
percent accessibility requirement unless a different percentage was
recommended by the Taxi and Limousine Commission after investigation. Id.
at 399.
100. Michael M. Grynbaum, Deal Struck to Broaden Taxi Service in the
City, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/nyregio
n/deal-is-struck-to-broaden-taxi-service-in-new-york-city.html.
101. See Green Cabs, 993 N.E.2d at 399.
102. Id. at 405.
103. Id. at 401.
104. Id. at 401.
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Act as one that furthered a substantial state interest.105 The
opinion suggests that the legislature had anticipated the
plaintiffs’ challenge, as the Act’s preamble clearly states “that
the public health, safety and welfare of the residents of the state
of New York traveling to, from, and within the city of New York
is a matter of substantial state concern, including access to safe
and reliable mass transportation such as taxicabs.”106 The court
neither confronted this statement nor did it explain why the
purported state concern was actually substantial. Instead, as in
PBA II, the court merely endorsed the legislature’s position and
used it to support its conclusion; again, implying that
legislation’s mere articulation of a state concern and a rational
relationship are sufficient for the State to intrude in local affairs.
IV. The Home Rule Problem and How It Should Be Solved
A. Background
Under our federal system, the federal government may only
act consistently with the specific powers enumerated in the
Federal Constitution. While the Supremacy Clause ensures that
the Federal Constitution and federal laws generally take
precedence over state constitutions and state laws,107 the federal
government and those of the fifty states share power in countless
ways.108 By contrast, the localities in each of the fifty states exist
solely because the State allows them to exist. It is the State that
sets the geographic boundaries of the localities and prescribes
their powers. In New York, this means that a locality may only
adopt a law that is not inconsistent with the state constitution
or any state general law when that local law is either (i) related
to its property, affairs or government;109 (ii) listed in the bill of

105. Id.
106. HAIL Act, ch. 602, § 1.
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
108. These shared powers are referred to as concurrent powers. See
Robert Longley, Federalism: A Government System of Shared Powers,
THOUGHT CO. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/federalism-powersnational-and-state-governments-3321841.
109. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(i).
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rights;110 (iii) listed in article IX as an additional power (i.e., one
not related to a locality’s property, affairs or government) unless
restricted by the State;111 (iv) granted by the statute of local
governments112 or the Municipal Home Rule Law;113 or (v)
conferred by the State as an additional power (i.e., one not
related to a locality’s property affairs or government, and in
addition to those listed above). Most of these laws can always be
nullified or restricted by subsequent state legislation.114
Given this dynamic, some commentators have questioned
whether the arguments advanced by the Law Department in the
cases discussed above were in the long-term best interests of the
City.115 They contend that by emphasizing preemption and state
110. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
111. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii).
112. N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV. § 10 (McKinney 1994) (enacted pursuant to
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2).
113. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1994).
114. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(3).
115. See Richard Briffault, Bloomberg’s Legal Legacy – Closing Remarks,
CITY SQUARE (Dec. 4, 2012), http://urbanlawjournal.com/bloombergsymposium-closing-remarks/ (closing remarks at the Fordham Urban Law
Journal Symposium: Bloomberg’s Legal Legacy). The speaker commented:
[A] particularly striking feature of the Bloomberg
Administration’s approach to home rule (although it is one
shared with the Giuliani Administration) . . . is the attempt
to blunt home rule by invoking state law, and on at least one
occasion actually securing a state law, to limit the scope of
the City’s legal authority.
....
. . . [A]s a teacher of local government law, and a believer
in the importance of home rule, I find it a little unsettling
when New York City’s Mayor argues before the state courts
that a state law preempts a City initiative. It is even more
unsettling when, in order to win a policy dispute, the Mayor
asks the state to turn what had long been a field of City
regulation into a matter of state concern and a subject for
state legislative determination. Once a state has taken over
a subject, it may be hard for the City - and for future Mayors
- to get it back. Perhaps naively, I think the Mayor ought to
be fighting to expand City power, not seeking laws and court
rulings that would limit it.
Id. See also Roberta A. Kaplan & Jacob H. Hupart, Can New York City Govern
Itself? The Incongruity of the Court of Appeals’ Recent Cases Regarding
Regulation of New York City by New York City, 78 ALB. L. REV. 105, 109 (2015).
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interest to further the administration’s more immediate agenda,
the Law Department may have compromised future local
authority.116 However, even critics would likely agree that
crafting creative arguments and invoking persuasive precedent
to achieve the desired outcome for one’s client is the goal and
obligation of any lawyer. Many of the cases discussed above,
such as Green Cabs, involved important and long desired social
initiatives. A lawyer for the government should certainly advise
the mayor of the potential long-term downsides of taking a
particular legal position that might create a troublesome
precedent. However, if the client decides that he or she wants
to push forward because of the importance of the proposed
legislation, a responsible lawyer cannot avoid making those
arguments because of a theoretical concern that the precedent
established might, at some indeterminable time in the future, be
cited against the client.117
In any event, the discussion above clearly illustrates the
significant problems with the manner in which the Home Rule
“Similarly, another commentator noted that ‘[j]udicial acceptance of the lack of
need for such a home rule message might weaken the city’s long-term interest
in resisting interference from future state legislatures in the operations of New
York City, to the dismay of future mayors and corporation counsels.’” Id.
116. See Briffault, supra note 115.
Court decisions reading state laws broadly to occupy a field
and bar local regulation or that treat local additions to or
departures from state law as in conflict with local measures
become precedents for future challenges to City laws which
can wind up curbing future Mayors. There may be a conflict
here between the immediate political and policy needs of any
mayoral administration, with a willingness to use whatever
legal tools are at hand, including state preemption, to
advance its goals, and the long-term interest of the City in
being able to chart its own destiny with less interference from
the state.
Id. See also Roberta A. Kaplan, New York City Taxis and the New York State
Legislature: What is Left of the State Constitution’s Home Rule Clause After the
Court of Appeals Decision in the HAIL Act Case?, 77 ALB. L. REV. 113, 115-16
(2014) (“[i]n a move that challengers to the law characterized as ‘“an end-run”’
around constitutional safeguards,’ Mayor Bloomberg instead urged the New
York State Legislature to pass the [HAIL Act].”) [hereinafter Home Rule After
the Hail Act Decision].
117. Michael A. Cardozo, The Conflicting Ethical, Legal, and Public Policy
Obligations of the Government’s Chief Legal Officer, 22 PROF. LAW. 4, 5-6
(2014).
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provisions are interpreted today. Highlighting that issue is the
legislature’s recent passage of a bill to halt the implementation
of the City’s “bag tax.”118 The bill was a direct response to the
City Council’s passage—intended to reduce the use of carryout
bags as part of a broader effort to address the City’s
environmental concerns—of a law, which, with limited
exceptions, imposed a five-cent fee on the use of plastic or paper
bags at retail, convenience, and grocery stores.119 In response,
the recent state law prohibits “any local law or ordinance, or any
rule or regulation, by a city with a population of one million or
more, related to charging a fee for carryout merchandise bags
(‘carryout bags’) or a fee of similar effect.”120 While the
legislation does not explicitly refer to the City, its intended
application is clear—there are no other municipalities in New
York with more than one million people.121 In fact, other
localities, including Suffolk County and parts of Westchester,
have similar bag tax laws which are not prohibited by the state
legislation.122
Given the targeted nature of the bill, it would seem to be a
special law, which would require a Home Rule message from the
City in order to take effect. Since there was no such request from
the City, the state law, on its face, appears unconstitutional.
118. See S. 4158, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (opposing
implementation of 2016 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 63). Notwithstanding the
preferred terminology of the bill’s sponsors, the five-cent charge is not a tax
but rather a fee since the funds are earmarked for store owners and not the
government. Some, like Governor Cuomo, have suggested that the fee would
be more appropriate as a statewide tax so that the government could direct the
funds to support environmental welfare initiatives. See Jesse McKinley,
Cuomo Blocks New York City Plastic Bag Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/nyregion/cuomo-blocks-new-york-cityplastic-bag-law.html?_r=0. Because the City cannot impose a tax without the
legislature’s approval, the City, to avoid having to ask the legislature for
permission to impose a bag tax, instead proved that users of plastic bags would
pay a fee to the store owners. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; see also supra text
accompanying notes 8-11.
119. See 2016 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 63.
120. S. 4158, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
121. New York Cities by Population, NEW YORK DEMOGRAPHICS BY CUBIT,
http://www.newyork-demographics.com/cities_by_population (last visited Mar.
5, 2017).
122. See S. Walter Packaging, New York – Bag Legislation, BAGLAWS.COM,
http://www.baglaws.com/legislation.php?state=New+York (last visited Sept. 4,
2017).
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However, because the bill technically refers to an “open class” of
municipalities (i.e., any and all cities with a population of one
million people or more), it would likely survive constitutional
challenge. Indeed, similar “classification” laws have long been
upheld by the courts.123
But should the legislature be so readily able to override a
local law that was validly enacted and impacts only the locality
itself? That was the question posed by Senator Liz Krueger in
opposition to the legislature’s bill eliminating the “bag tax”124
and one that lies at the heart of the Home Rule debate.
When the present Home Rule provisions were adopted more
than fifty years ago, they were heralded as “strengthen[ing] the
governments closest to the people.”125 Given the manner in
which those provisions have been interpreted, that goal clearly
has not been met. Certainly, it would seem that those city
representatives, not persons elected from localities throughout
the entire state, should be able to decide whether to allow the
use of plastic bags, or how disputes with their unions should be
resolved, or whether red light cameras to apprehend speeding
drivers on city streets should be installed.126 In addition, local
legislatures should not be left to guess whether, under the guise
of “implied preemption,” a court will determine that the local
legislature lacks the power to legislate in a particular area, such
as safety for a public hospital, or the rules to be followed when
entering into a municipal contract.
123. See, e.g., Farrington v. Pinckney, 133 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1956)
(upholding classification by counties based on populations of one hundred
thousand); Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Res. of N.Y., 385 N.E.2d 1284,
1290-92 (N.Y. 1978) (finding that an act allowing tax and condemnation rights
through a set of criteria only applying, in effect, to the Museum of Modern Art
was a general law because, in the future, the criteria could possibly apply to
other similar institutions).
124. Liz Krueger, Statement from Senator Krueger on Governor Signing
Plastic Bag Preemption Bill, N.Y. ST. SENATE (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/liz-krueger/statementsenator-krueger-governor-signing-plastic-bag.
125. See Ward, supra note 5, at 547.
126. See generally Danielle Furfaro & Kirstan Conley, Bill for More Speed
Cameras Stops in Senate, N.Y. POST (June 22, 2017, 1:28 AM)
http://nypost.com/2017/06/22/legislators-vote-to-double-the-citys-number-ofspeed-cameras/?mc_cid=27966076b1&mc_eid=84a564f8a5
(although
the
assembly voted to nearly double the number of cameras in the City’s speed
camera program from 140 to 290, the senate failed to vote on the measure).
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There are clearly important benefits weighing in favor of
state intervention in certain local affairs. Cities are, by nature,
“creatures of the state,” and their authority to self-govern is
similarly state-derived.127 Municipalities throughout New York,
particularly upstate, depend on the State to oversee necessities
like water supply and roadways, and to intervene when local
measures prove inadequate or conflict with the legitimate
interests of an adjoining locality. However, there are also
important benefits to local control (i.e., Home Rule). Local
officials presumably know their constituents best and have their
finger on the pulse of the needs and concerns of the communities
they govern. Instances such as the legislature’s overturning the
bag tax epitomize why Home Rule in New York has largely
vanished and has even been referred to as a “ghost.”128
As discussed above, preemption has frequently been
applied by the courts to invalidate local legislation which
directly conflicts or is otherwise inconsistent with state law.
This may include subject matter which the State has expressly
preempted (e.g., by statute) or where such preemption may be
inferred (e.g., comprehensive state regulation).129 The problem
with this framework is the uncertainty faced by local
governments in the face of the State’s position of dominance. As
referenced above, a local law may be preempted by state
legislation if it is found: (i) to place additional restrictions on
state law or (ii) vary from state procedure.130 This is why the
court of appeals found the City Council’s enactment of the
Domestic Partner legislation to be an undue restriction on the
state’s competitive bidding statute even though the regulation of
contractors is reserved to municipalities (and notwithstanding
127. See generally 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) (explaining that Dillon’s Rule
maintains that municipalities only have the powers that are: (1) expressly
granted to them by the state legislature; (2) necessarily implied or necessarily
incident to the powers expressly granted; and (3) absolutely essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the municipality–not simply convenient but
indispensable).
128. See James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York: “The
Ghost of Home Rule,” 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 715 (1985).
129. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487, 490 (N.Y. 1983)
(“[t]he intent to pre-empt need not be express. It is enough that the
[l]egislature has impliedly evinced its desire to do so.”).
130. See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905-06 (N.Y. 1987).
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the absence of an explicit state law to the contrary).131 While
applying the preemption doctrine may certainly be nuanced at
times, it is often employed to strike down local laws and has
consequently undermined the efficacy of Home Rule. The court
of appeals conceded as much in observing that “[t]he preemption
doctrine represents a fundamental limitation on home rule
powers.”132
Any solution to these problems by way of constitutional
amendment of the Home Rule provisions must, therefore,
address both the preemption and substantial state concern
doctrines.
B. Preemption
To address the preemption problem, the constitution
should be amended to make clear that local laws should not be
found preempted unless the language in the particular state law
makes explicit the legislature’s intent for the state law to be
controlling. Not only would this allow localities to act with a
clearer understanding of whether a proposed local law would be
found preempted, but it would incentivize clarity in the
legislature’s lawmaking process. If the legislature wants to
ascribe preemptive effect to a particular law or to an entire
regulatory field, it should be required to make that intention
abundantly clear in the text of the applicable provision. This
would limit instances of preemption to circumstances where
either the legislature plainly forbade a local enactment or where
such an enactment would render it impossible to comply with
analogous state law.
A constitutional amendment requiring this type of clarity
would eliminate much of the local uncertainty surrounding
Home Rule as well as reinvigorate local control. In Illinois, for
example, the state constitution affords home rule powers to
municipalities equivalent to those of the state, unless the state
law asserts its exclusive authority.133 This structure serves to
131. Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433, 439-40 (N.Y. 2006).
132. Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 922
(N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted).
133. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i). Similarly, in Alaska, the state’s highest
court has held that the state legislature cannot occupy a field unless it
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preserve the state’s power to preempt local law while
simultaneously supporting local autonomy.134 It also forces the
state legislature to declare its intent to preempt when it believes
such to be necessary.135 Further, it undoubtedly limits instances
where the judiciary might find a local law preempted when the
state legislature did not so intend.136 Therefore, the proposed
amended Home Rule provision must clearly state that if a clear
conflict exists between a local law and state statute containing
explicit preemption language, the local law should be deemed
preempted; but if the State’s intent to preempt is not clear, the
local law should be found valid. In addition, to avoid the
possibility that the legislature might then include express
preemption language in all applicable legislation, the proposed
amended Home Rule provision should carve out certain areas
where localities’ Home Rule powers may not be limited or
denied.
C. Substantial State Concern
The substantial state concern doctrine must also be dealt
with through amendment of the constitution’s Home Rule
language. As detailed above, while the constitution provides
that the legislature may not enact a special law concerning the
“property, affairs or government” of a particular locality without
first securing the affected locality’s permission via a Home Rule
message,137 this provision has been weakened considerably by
courts consistently ruling that this limitation is not applicable
where the State itself maintains an interest in the subject
matter of the legislation.138 Since there are few topics today in
explicitly states such an intent. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Repasky, 34
P.3d 302, 311 (Alaska 2001) (“[i]n general, for state law to preempt local
authority, it is not enough for state law to occupy the field. Rather, ‘if the
legislature wishes to “preempt” an entire field, [it] must so state.’”).
134. Richard Briffault, “Mind the Gap” The Promise and Limits of Home
Rule in New York, in NEW YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE GOVERNANCE
CRISIS AND THE PATH TO RENEWED GREATNESS 161, 174-76 (Peter J. Galie,
Christopher Bopst, & Gerald Benjamin eds., 2016).
135. Id. at 186-87.
136. Id.
137. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2).
138. See Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929).
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which the State does not have at least an arguable interest, this
“exception” has largely become the rule. While there are
certainly areas where local and state interests overlap, and at
times where there may be a legitimate need for state
intervention with (or even without) local consent, the
substantial state concern doctrine has almost completely
eviscerated article IX’s Home Rule protections.139
To address this circumvention of Home Rule, the
constitution should be amended to clarify when a Home Rule
message is not required; that is, to delineate the subject areas
where the State could act on matters that affect localities
because they may, in fact, be matters of substantial state
concern. Like education and the courts, areas already listed in
the constitution as ones subject to state control,140 the
constitution could list additional topics which should
predominantly, but not necessarily exclusively, lie within the
State’s purview, including subjects like transportation and the
environment. This would provide localities with a measure of
predictability currently lacking in the Home Rule context as well
as delineate which areas should be subject to the substantial
state concern test.
However, the State’s authority over these enumerated
subject areas should not be as unfettered as it is for the school
and judicial systems. The identified topics of potential state
concern should be labeled “state interests,” but the State would
still have to make clear in the particular legislation, and be
subject to a much more rigorous standard of judicial review than
has been applied to date, that the specific issue at hand is in fact
of substantial state concern. This should be done by including
language in the constitution (i) requiring a detailed legislative
finding that the matter constitutes or relates to a specific,
substantial state interest, and (ii) requiring, in order for the
preemption to be found valid, a more compelling connection than
a mere rational relationship between the law and the specific
substantial state interest.
First, the constitution should specifically describe the
factors to be considered in determining whether a state interest

139. See Cole, supra note 128, at 713-15.
140. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3.

29

CARDOZO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

HOME RULE IN NEW YORK

10/23/17 10:08 PM

119

rises to the level of potentially being “substantial.” These should
include: the importance of state uniformity in the implicated
subject matter (e.g., due to the State’s expertise in that
particular field); the impact of the local legislation on individuals
or municipalities outside the affected municipality (e.g., if it
would negatively or unreasonably interfere with daily life or
essential services); and the manner in which localities and the
State had managed past control over the topic (e.g., which entity
had primarily been responsible for or supervised activity within
that domain).141 While none of these elements would be outcome
determinative, each factor would serve an instructive role in the
court’s analysis.142
Second, and most importantly, the largely deferential
rational basis standard used in applying the state concern test
today, which, similar to the equal protection context, is employed
to validate measures reasonably related to any conceivable
legitimate state interest, should be abandoned as not
appropriate for Home Rule analysis. That is, the rational basis
standard is not designed to achieve the sensitive balancing of
local and state interests required to resolve Home Rule
disputes.143 Instead, just as the identified state interest should
be required to be “substantial,” so, too, should the relationship
between the proposed legislation and that state interest be
required to be “substantial.” This is because of the basic reasons
behind the Home Rule provisions—to recognize the important
role played by local government. Therefore, the constitution
should require the application of a standard of review more
consistent with the intermediate level of judicial scrutiny so that
the challenged state law must be substantially related to the
purported state interest.144 This would increase the State’s
burden to demonstrate how the enactment would actually
advance the identified substantial state interest, as well as
prevent the legislature from merely declaring as much in the

141. See Kaplan, supra note 116, at 125.
142. Id.
143. See City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n Inc., 676
N.E.2d 847, 850-52 (N.Y. 1996).
144. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“[t]o withstand
intermediate scrutiny, a [challenged law] must be substantially related to an
important governmental objective.”).
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language of the law itself. Thus, a reviewing court would need
to be convinced that (i) the legislation falls within one of the
delineated subject areas identified as a state interest; (ii) the
state interest expressed in the legislation is indeed substantial
due, for instance, to the State’s prior control over that topic or
credible need to maintain uniformity in the field; and (iii) the
legislation substantially relates to that substantial state
interest as demonstrated by statistical or other empirical
evidence.
V. Conclusion
Home Rule in New York in its current form is, at best,
tenuous and, at worst, inconsequential. Home Rule is a vital
concept and one in dire need of remediation. Although the
recommendations proposed above may not cure all of the
maladies currently afflicting Home Rule in New York, they are
suggested with the hope that they may provide some of the
treatment necessary to revive Home Rule.
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